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Abstract
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory, there exists a number of universally con-
verging adjustment processes. In game theory, these processes typically serve the role of selecting
a Nash equilibrium. Examples are, the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium
selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey. In general equilibrium, the processes are
adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are the processes studied
by Smale, Kamiya, van der Laan and Talman, and Herings. The underlying reasons for conver-
gence have remained rather mysterious in the literature, and convergence of different processes has
seemed unrelated. This paper shows that convergence of all these processes relies on Browder’s
fixed point theorem.
© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C62; C63; C68; C72
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1. Introduction
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory, there exists a number of adjust-
ment processes that are universally convergent. A universally convergent adjustment process
in game theory is an adjustment process that converges to a Nash equilibrium for almost
all games. A universally convergent adjustment process in general equilibrium theory is
an adjustment process that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium for almost all economies.
In game theory, these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium.
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Examples are the tracing procedure ofHarsanyi and Selten (1988)or the equilibrium se-
lection procedure proposed byMcKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In general equilibrium, the
processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are
the processes studied bySmale (1976), van der Laan and Talman (1987), Kamiya (1990)
andHerings (1997).
There are several reasons to be interested in universally convergent adjustment processes.
They give players in a game the opportunity to coordinate on a uniquely determined Nash
equilibrium and an auctioneer in an economy to determine a competitive equilibrium price
system. In a more decentralized setting, they give rational agents in an economy the pos-
sibility to coordinate on current and future prices. Such processes can be used as a tool
to compute equilibria, which is also helpful for comparative statics exercises or policy
recommendations, seeJudd (1997)andEaves and Schmedders (1999).
In game theory, multiplicity of Nash equilibria seems to be the rule rather than the
exception. This poses serious problems for Nash equilibrium to be used as a solution concept
for games. One way out is to develop a theory that selects a unique equilibrium for any
game form, and to suppose that all players adopt that theory. An attempt to make such a
theory can be found inHarsanyi and Selten (1988). That theory relies heavily on the tracing
procedure as introduced inHarsanyi (1975). The tracing procedure is a strategy adjustment
procedure by which players can adopt initial beliefs about the play of their opponents and
turn them into uniquely determined beliefs consistent with Nash equilibrium. The surprising
aspect of the tracing procedure is that convergence to a Nash equilibrium takes place for
almost any game for almost any initial beliefs, so the tracing procedure is universally
convergent.
Quantal response equilibria as introduced inMcKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria, where each player’s payoff is subject to random error. The
concept of equilibrium is consistent in the sense that all players maximize their utility given
the choices made by the others, and the utility maximizing behavior of a player, together
with the error structure, leads to the mixed strategy against which the others optimize.
Quantal response equilibria are quite successful in describing the behavior of participants
in experiments.McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)also consider a procedure similar to the
tracing procedure to select a Nash equilibrium. Start with the quantal response equilibrium
where choices are completely determined by the error terms, and follow the path of quantal
response equilibria that results when the error terms vanish. McKelvey and Palfrey show
that for almost all games, a unique Nash equilibrium is selected in this way. Again, universal
convergence of the procedure is obtained.
The simplest price adjustment process studied in general equilibrium theory is the Wal-
rasian tatonnement process. It is well-known that it may not converge to a competitive
equilibrium, seeScarf (1960)for some examples. The work ofSonnenschein (1972, 1973),
Mantel (1974)and Debreu (1974), basically claiming that any continuous function sat-
isfying homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras’ law is the excess demand function of an
economy, makes clear that it is possible to construct many examples where Walrasian taton-
nement does not converge and displays highly irregular dynamic behavior. The work ofSaari
and Simon (1978)andSaari (1985)implies that simple adaptations of the Walrasian taton-
nement process will not have better convergence properties. Still, at least three universally
convergent price adjustment processes are known in the literature, Smale’s global Newton
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method introduced inSmale (1976), the process ofKamiya (1990), and the process pro-
posed invan der Laan and Talman (1987)for which universal convergence has been shown
in Herings (1997).
The global Newton method of Smale provides a price adjustment rule that does converge
to a competitive equilibrium for almost any economy, so universal convergence is the case.
But it does not converge for any initial price system. Only when the initial price system is
chosen such that the prices of some commodities are sufficiently close to zero, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium can be shown. From the work ofKeenan (1981), it follows
that there may exist an open set of starting price systems for which Smale’s process does
not converge to some competitive equilibrium price system.
Another universally convergent price adjustment process has been presented inKamiya
(1990). Under rather weak conditions on the total excess demand function, convergence
to a competitive equilibrium price system is guaranteed for almost every starting price
system. Although the boundary conditions of Kamiya are weak, they are not derived from
assumptions on primitive concepts.
An alternative price adjustment process has been proposed invan der Laan and Talman
(1987). For this process, universal convergence has been shown inHer gs (1997). Under
standard conditions on utility functions, consumption sets and initial endowments, this
price adjustment process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system for almost all
economies and almost all starting price systems.
Apparently, several processes in distinct areas of research have been shown to be uni-
versally convergent. The reason for these strong convergence properties has remained mys-
terious up to now, and the convergence proofs were rather ad hoc as a consequence. The
aim of the current paper is to point out that convergence of each one of these processes
can be understood from fixed point theory and is not even related to differentiability. This
makes our proofs very different from the original convergence proofs. It also increases our
understanding as to why these distinct adjustment processes converge. This understanding
is useful to develop other universally convergent mechanisms that may incorporate features
that are lacking in current processes.
Some alternatives and extensions have already been suggested. The procedure described
in Yamamoto (1993)may serve as an alternative to the tracing procedure, andJoosten and
Talman (1997)describe an alternative price adjustment process. Extensions have been made
to economies with linear or constant returns to scale production (seevan den Elzen, 1993,
1997; van den Elzen et al., 1994), and to economies with short-run price rigidities (see
Herings, 1996; Herings et al., 1997, 1998, 1999). All these extensions can be understood
as well from the unifying treatment that is given in this paper.
The organization of the paper is as follows. InSection 2, we outline the general structure
behind the approach that is used in our proofs and we present the most important tool
required, Browder’s fixed point theorem. InSection 3, we apply this methodology to the
tracing procedure ofHarsanyi and Selten (1988)and inSection 4to the equilibrium selection
procedure proposed byMcKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Next we turn to price adjustment
processes. We treat Kamiya’s process inSection 5, the process proposed invan der Laan
and Talman (1987)in Section 6, and Smale’s global Newton method inSection 7. Section 8
discusses and illustrates how the approach suggested can be used to derive new adjustment
processes.Section 9concludes.
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2. A unifying approach
Before turning to the specific adjustment processes, it is helpful to highlight the approach
that can be used to give a unifying treatment of convergence. Usually, dynamic processes




wherex(t) ∈ Rm denotes the state vector reached at timet ∈ R+ andg is a function from
some subset of the state spaceRm into Rm. The vectorx typically corresponds to a mixed
strategy combination in case of a strategy adjustment process, and to a price system for a
price adjustment process. The functiong specifies the way in which players adjust their
strategies, or prices adjust in general equilibrium. The initial statex(0) is assumed to be
given.
Conditions for which the system of differential equations has a solution are well-known,
see for instanceHirsch and Smale (1974). The orbitγ (x(0)) is the set of state vectors
that is generated by the system of first-order differential equations when the initial state
is x(0),
γ (x(0)) = {x ∈ Rm|∃t ≥ 0, x = x(t)}.
We denote the closure ofγ (x(0)) by γ̄ (x(0)), and callγ̄ (x(0)) an orbit as well.
Although all adjustment processes we consider can be formulated as a system of differ-
ential equations, they can alternatively be described by the orbit that they generate. In fact,
all adjustment processes considered share the property that the easiest way to formulate
them is in terms of the orbit that they generate. For each adjustment process, we define a
system of equations whose solutions correspond to the orbit of the adjustment process. We
study the properties of the set of solutions to the system of equations by means of fixed
point theory and not by the theory of dynamic systems. In this paper we argue that the
convergence of various adjustment processes is best understood from a single fixed point
theorem that is introduced inBrowder (1960).
Theorem 2.1 (Browder’s fixed point theorem).Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex
subset of Rm and let ϕ : [0,1] × S → S be a continuous function. Then the set of fixed
points, Fϕ = {(λ, s) ∈ [0,1] × S|s = ϕ(λ, s)} contains a connected set, F cϕ , such that
({0} × S) ∩ F cϕ = ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ F cϕ = ∅.
Theorem 2.1implies that for allλ ∈ [0,1], ({λ} × S) ∩ Fϕ = ∅. That property would
also follow from a repeated application of the well-known fixed point theorem ofBr uwer
(1912). The surprising part of the theorem is that there exists a connected setF cϕ with those
properties. Notice that along the connected set of fixed points, it is not necessarily the case
thatλ increases monotonically from 0 to 1. The value ofλ increases initially, may decrease
later on, and will eventually increase until it reaches the value 1.
In all sections, the strategy of proof is the same. A functionϕ satisfying Browder’s
fixed point theorem is constructed such that the fixed points in the connected setF cϕ corre-
spond in a one-one way to the orbit generated by the adjustment process. The value ofλ
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indicates the amount of progress of the adjustment process. Atλ = 0, a fixed point corre-
sponds to the initial state vectorx(0). At λ = 1, a fixed point yields an equilibrium state
vector.
Our assumptions on primitives are so weak, that orbits are not necessarily nicely behaved
sets, that is differentiable paths or loops. In exceptional cases it is for instance possible that
pitchforks may arise, or even higher dimensional solution sets. Such exceptional cases are
usually excluded by making differentiability assumptions and employing a transversality
argument.
Let Φ be the set of twice continuously differentiable functionsϕ : [0,1] × S → S
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence of the values of the function and its
first partial derivatives. Theorem 2 in Mas-Colell (1974) asserts that there is an open and
dense setΦ ′ ⊂ Φ, such that for everyϕ ∈ Φ ′ the setF cϕ is a closed segment, that is
a set diffeomorphic to the unit interval [0,1], and only the end points of the segment
intersect{0,1} × S, so one end point intersects{0} × S and the other{1} × S. This result
is not completely surprising as the setF cϕ is defined by a number of equations equal to the
dimension ofS in a number of unknowns equal to the dimension ofS+1, leaving one degree
of freedom for the solution set. Mas-Colell’s result does not require{0} × S to be unique.
This, however, is important for algorithmic purposes, as it avoids the problem which point
in {0} × S is connected to{1} × S.
Since an orbitγ̄ (x(0)) of an adjustment process corresponds in a one-one way to the
fixed points of the mappingϕ, it follows as a consequence of Theorem 2 in Mas-Colell
(1974) that generically an orbit is a nicely behaved set that does not allow for pitchforks or
higher dimensional solution sets. In particular, an orbitγ̄ (x(0)) connectsx(0) to a unique
equilibrium. It is for this reason that we concentrate, in this paper, on the property that
γ̄ (x(0)) connectsx(0) to some equilibrium. The stronger property thatγ̄ (x(0)) is connected
by a segment to a unique equilibrium follows by suitable differentiability assumptions and
transversality arguments.
In the strategy adjustment processes ofSections 3 and 4, the parameterλ is an explicit
part of the adjustment process and is inversely related to the weight given to the prior and
the level by which players make errors, respectively. The functionϕ : [0,1] × S → S is
such that(λ, s) ∈ γ̄ (x(0)) if and only if (λ, s) ∈ F cϕ .
In the price adjustment processes ofSections 5–7, there is no explicit parameterλ. For
λ ∈ [0,1], a subsetT (λ) of the state space is defined, which is strictly increasing inλ.
The setT (0) corresponds to the starting price systemp0, whereasT (1) contains all price
systems of interest. The numberλ(x) ∈ [0,1] is defined to be such thatλ(x) = λ if x
belongs to the boundary ofT (λ). The numberλ(x), therefore, measures the distance ofx
to x(0). The functionϕ : [0,1] × S → S is constructed such thatx ∈ γ̄ (x(0)) if and only
if (λ(x), x) ∈ F cϕ .
Our construction also suggests alternative functionsϕ that lead to orbits̄γ (x(0)) corre-
sponding to novel adjustment processes, for instance by specifying alternative subsetsT (λ).
Section 8illustrates how such a new adjustment process can be derived.Section 8also dis-
cusses the reverse question. How to specify a system of differential equations that leads to
γ̄ (x(0)) as an orbit?Section 8shows that this can be achieved by applying the so-called
Davidenko equations(Davidenko, 1953)to the system of equations characterizing the orbit
γ̄ (x(0)).
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3. The tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten
The tracing procedure is used repeatedly in the equilibrium selection theory ofHarsanyi
and Selten (1988)to find a unique solution of the so-called basic games. It is also used to de-
fine risk-dominance relationships between Nash equilibria. It models a process of convergent
expectations that rational players can use to find a particular Nash equilibrium as the solu-
tion for a given game. Before applying the tracing procedure, players are assumed to have a
common probability distribution expressing their expectations about the strategy choices of
the other players. This common probability distribution is called a prior. In the linear tracing
procedure the information on the best replies to the prior is gradually fed back into the expec-
tations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the prior and the best
responses will gradually change until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider a non-cooperativeN -person normal form gameΓ = (Φ1, . . . , ΦN,R1, . . . ,
RN). Each playeri = 1, . . . , N , hasMi pure strategies. Thek-th pure strategy of playeri is
denoted by(i, k). The set of pure strategies of playeri is denoted byΦi . The total number of
strategies is given byM = ∑Ni=1Mi . The set of all pure strategy combinations is given by
Φ = ∏Ni=1Φi . The functionRi : Φ → R denotes the payoff function of a playeri and it is
extended in the standard way to the set of all mixed strategy combinationsS = ∏Ni=1 SMi .
Here we identify all probability distributions onΦi with SMi = {si ∈ RMi+ |
∑Mi
j=1 sij = 1}.
Given a mixed strategy combinations ∈ S and a mixed strategȳsi ∈ Si , we denote by
s \ s̄i the mixed strategy combination that results from replacingsi by s̄i . The set of Nash
equilibria ofΓ is denoted NE(Γ ).
A probability distributions0 ∈ S, called the prior, is given for the remainder of this
paper. The prior describes the initial beliefs of all players about the strategies played by the
other players. The prior is assumed to be the same for all players, and the determination
of the prior is part of the equilibrium selection theory ofHarsanyi and Selten (1988). For
everyλ ∈ [0,1], the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ λ = (Φ1, . . . , ΦN,Hλ1 , . . . , HλN), where the payoff functionHλi : Φ → R of playeri is
defined by
Hλi (φ) = λRi(φ)+ (1 − λ)Ri(s0 \ φi).
It is straightforward to extendHλi to the set of all mixed strategy combinationsS =∏N
i=1 SMi . The gameΓ 0 corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that
all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior beliefs. The gameΓ 1
coincides with the gameΓ . The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the
gameΓ 0 to a Nash equilibrium ofΓ 1. LetL denote the set of all Nash equilibria related to
the gamesΓ λ, λ ∈ [0,1], so
L = {(λ, s) ∈ [0,1] × S|s ∈ NE(Γ λ)}.
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a continuous functionγ :
[0,1] → L, i.e. a path, such thatγ (0) ∈ L∩ ({0}×S) andγ (1) ∈ L∩ ({1}×S). The linear
tracing procedure is said to be well-defined if each pathγ : [0,1] → L such thatγ (0) ∈
L∩ ({0} × S) andγ (1) ∈ L∩ ({1} × S) has the same image. We consider feasibility as the
more difficult property to establish. Indeed, as it has been argued inSection 2, it is possible
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to go from feasibility to well-definedness by invoking certain regularity properties ofL, for
a rigorous proof in the context of the tracing procedure, seeH rings and Peeters (2001).
SinceL is a set that can be described by a finite union of sets described by a finite number
of polynomial inequalities, it is a semi-algebraic set. All the components ofL, that is all
maximally connected subsets ofL, are also path-connected. Therefore, any two points in
a component ofL can be joined by a path, see for instanceSchanuel et al. (1991)for a
nice introduction into the properties of semi-algebraic sets. To show that the linear tracing
procedure is feasible, it is sufficient to show thatL has a component that intersects both the
sets{0} × S and{1} × S.
The proof of feasibility of the linear tracing procedure presented here is not new. It
coincides with one of the proofs proposed inHerings (2000). It is repeated here for illustra-
tional purposes, as the connection between Browder’s fixed point theorem and the tracing
procedure is the closest of all the adjustment processes that we will consider.
Let the functionσi : [0,1] × S → SMi be defined by
σi(λ, s) = arg max
s̄i∈SMi
λRi(s \ s̄i )+ (1 − λ)Ri(s0 \ s̄i )− ‖s̄i − si‖22.
The functionσi is well-defined and continuous because it is the argmax of a function that
is strictly concave, because its first two terms are linear ins̄i , while the third is strictly
concave.
We define the functionf : [0,1] × S → S by
f (λ, s) = (σ1(λ, s), . . . , σN(λ, s)).
The fixed points of are closely related to the strategies in the setL.
Theorem 3.1. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ , for any prior s0, it holds that
(λ, s) ∈ L if and only if f (λ, s) = s.
Proof. It is obvious that(λ, s) ∈ L impliesf (λ, s) = s.
Suppose there is(λ̄, s̄) ∈ [0,1]×S such thatf (λ̄, s̄) = s̄, but(λ̄, s̄) /∈ L. Then, for some




i (s̄ \ (i, k)),
it holds that, for 0< ε < 1,Hλ̄i (s̄ \ εsi + (1 − ε)s̄i) − Hλ̄i (s̄) = εh > 0. Now,‖(εsi +
(1 − ε)s̄i) − s̄i‖2 = ε2‖si − s̄i‖2 < εh, for small enoughε, contradicting that̄si is the
argument maximizing the expression in the definition ofσi(λ̄, s̄). 
The argument given in the proof ofTheorem 3.1is the same as the one used inGeanakoplos
(1996), where Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, as opposed to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem,
is used to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite non-cooperativeN -p rson
game.
Theorem 3.2. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ , for any prior s0, the tracing
procedure is feasible.
Proof. It is immediate thatf satisfies the conditions of Browder’s fixed point theorem
and so there is a componentF c of F = {(λ, s) ∈ [0,1] × S|s = f (λ, s)} such that
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({0} × S)∩F c = ∅ and({1} × S)∩F c = ∅. By Theorem 3.1it follows thatF = L, soF c
is a subset ofL that connects a best response to the priors0 to a Nash equilibriums∗. 
Theorem 3.2demonstrates that feasibility of the tracing procedure is a corollary to
Browder’s fixed point theorem.
4. The quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey
Quantal response equilibria as introduced inMcKelvey and Palfrey (1995), are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria, where each player’s payoff is subject to random error. One
possible interpretation is that players make errors according to some random process when
calculating their expected payoffs. An alternative interpretation is that players calculate
expected payoffs correctly, but have an additive payoff disturbance associated with each
available pure strategy. For a given specification of the error structure, a quantal response
equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior
subject to the error structure.
Consider a non-cooperativeN -person normal form gameΓ = (Φ1, . . . , ΦN,R1, . . . ,
RN). Playeri’s payoff when playing pure strategy(i, k) against a mixed strategy combina-
tion s is subject to error and is given by
R̂i(s \ (i, k)) = Ri(s \ (i, k))+ εik.
Playeri’s error vectorεi = (εi1, . . . , εiMi ) is distributed according to a joint distribution
with density functionφi . Given the vector of payoffs that playeri eceives when playing
his pure strategies and when errors are absent,R̄i = (Ri(s \ (i,1)), . . . , Ri(s \ (i,Mi)))
for somes ∈ S, theik-response setEik(R̄i) is defined as the set of error vectors that make
pure strategy(i, k) the best response, so
Eik(R̄i) = {εi ∈ RMi |R̄ik + εik ≥ R̄ij + εij, j = 1, . . . ,Mi}.





A quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy combinations∗ ∈ S that is consistent
with the error structure, thus
s∗ik = σik(Ri(s∗ \ (i,1)), . . . , Ri(s∗ \ (i,Mi))), i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi.
The following specification of the error structure is quite common in the theory of indi-
vidual choice behavior (seeLuce, 1959) and leads to the logistic quantal response equilibria.
For any parameterθ ≥ 0, the logistic quantal response function is defined by
σik(R̄i) = exp(θR̄ik)∑Mi
j=1 exp(θR̄ij)
, R̄i ∈ RMi ,
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and is obtained whenφi corresponds to the extreme value distribution. The parameterθ
is inversely related to the error level. Whenθ = 0, the choice of all players is completely
determined by the errors, and corresponds to playing all pure strategies with equal probabil-
ity. Whenθ approaches infinity, the influence of the errors disappears. This suggests a way
of selecting Nash equilibria analogously to the tracing procedure. Start from the quantal
response equilibrium atθ = 0 and let the influence of errors go to zero.McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995)show that for generic games, this approach selects a unique Nash equilib-
rium. We show that for all games the quantal response equilibrium atθ = 0 is connected
by a set of quantal response equilibria to at least one Nash equilibrium. As has been argued
in Section 2, the stronger property that a unique Nash equilibrium is selected follows from
differentiability assumptions and transversality arguments.
Given an error level corresponding toθ , the set of quantal response equilibria ofΓ is
denoted by QREθ (Γ ). LetQ denote the set of all quantal response equilibria for varying
values ofθ ∈ R+, so




(θ, s) ∈ R+ × S|sik = exp(θRi(s \ (i, k)))∑Mi
j=1 exp(θRi(s \ (i, j)))
,
i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi
}
.
To investigate whether the quantal response equilibrium atθ = 0 is connected to a Nash
equilibrium, it is useful to make the transformationθ = λ/(1 − λ) and to define
Q̃ =
{
(λ, s) ∈ [0,1)× S|sik = exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i, k)))∑Mi
j=1 exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i, j)))
,
i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi
}
.
We define the functionf : [0,1)× S → S by
fik(λ, s) = exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i, k)))∑Mi
j=1 exp((λ/(1 − λ))Ri(s \ (i, j)))
, i = 1, . . . , N, k=1, . . . ,Mi.
The fixed points of are closely related to the strategies in the setQ̃.
Theorem 4.1. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ , it holds that (λ, s) ∈ Q̃ if and
only if f (λ, s) = s.
Proof. Obvious. 
The following result follows immediately from Browder’s fixed point theorem, so a proof
is omitted.
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Theorem 4.2. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ , for any λ̄ ∈ (0,1), there is a
component Q̃
c
of Q̃ such that ({0} × S) ∩ Q̃c = ∅ and ({λ̄} × S) ∩ Q̃c = ∅.
The theorem makes clear that the unique quantal response equilibrium atθ = 0 is
connected by quantal response equilibria to a quantal response equilibrium for an arbitrarily
high value ofθ .
The next step is to extendTheorem 4.2and to consider what happens in the limit. In
particular, we want to show that the quantal response equilibrium atθ = 0 is connected by
quantal response equilibria to a Nash equilibrium. To this end, we define
Q̄ = Q̃ ∪ ({1} × NE(Γ ))
and we show the following result.
Theorem 4.3. For any non-cooperative N-person game Γ , there is a component Q̄
c
of Q̄
such that ({0} × S) ∩ Q̄c = ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ Q̄c = ∅.
Proof. For n ∈ N, denote the component̃Qc of Q̃ such that({0} × S) ∩ Q̃c = ∅ and
({1 − (1/n)} × S) ∩ Q̃c = ∅ by Q̃n. Note that, forn ∈ N, Q̃n ⊂ Q̃n+1. By Mas-Colell
(1985) (Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10), the closed limit of the sequenceQ̃n, denotedQ̄c, is
connected. We show that̄Qc ⊂ Q̄.
Let (λ̄, s̄) be an element of̄Q
c
. Then there exists a sequence of points{(λn, sn)}n∈N such
thatλn < 1, f (λn, sn) = sn, and(λn, sn) → (λ̄, s̄). If λ̄ < 1, then the continuity of
implies (λ̄, s̄) ∈ Q̃ ⊂ Q̄. Supposēλ = 1, and supposēs is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
there is a playeri, a pair of pure strategies(i, k) and(i, l), andε > 0 such that̄sik > 0, but
Ri(s̄ \ (i, k))+ ε < Ri(s̄ \ (i, l)). Sincesn → s̄, there isn̄ such thatRi(sn \ (i, k))+ ε <
Ri(s
n \ (i, l)) for all n ≥ n̄. However,
lim
n→∞fik(λ
n, sn) = lim
n→∞
exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i, k)))∑Mi
j=1 exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i, j)))
≤ lim
n→∞
exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i, k)))
exp(λn/(1 − λn)Ri(sn \ (i, l))) = 0.
Therefore,




n, sn) = 0,
a contradiction. We have shown thatQ̄
c ⊂ Q̄.
The property that({0} × S) ∩ Q̄c = ∅ and({1} × S) ∩ Q̄c = ∅ is immediate. 
As was the case for the tracing procedure, Browder’s fixed point theorem provides an
elegant way to show the connectedness of the quantal response equilibrium atθ = 0 to a
Nash equilibrium.
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5. The price adjustment process of Kamiya
In Kamiya (1990), the prices of commodities are normalized by assuming that
∑L
l=1(pl)2
= 1. An adjustment process is defined for a total excess demand functionz : RL+\{0} → RL





2 = 1. The following assumption is
made throughout this section.
Assumption 1. The functionz : RL+ \{0} → RL satisfies continuity, homogeneity, Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
Forp ∈ RL+ \ {0}, for l = 1, . . . , L, pl = 0 implieszl(p) > 0.
Assumption 1is a weak version of the assumptions inKamiya (1990), where also twice
continuous differentiability ofz onRL++ is assumed. Since prices are normalized such that∑L
l=1(pl)2 = 1, Walras’ law implies that we may replace the excess demand functionz by










and ẑl(p̂) = zl(p̂1, . . . , p̂L−1,
√
1 −∑L−1l=1 (p̂l)2), l = 1, . . . , L − 1. The functionẑ is
obtained by omitting the last component ofz and making use of the price normalization.
Kamiya’s process is a weighted average of Smale’s global Newton method,
∂ẑ(p̂)(dp̂/dt) = −λ(p̂)ẑ(p̂), and Walrasian tatonnement, (dp̂/dt) = ẑ(p̂). The weights
depend on the norm of the excess demand and the distance betweenp̂ and the initial price
systemp̂0, wherep̂0 denotes the initial price system with componentL left out. When









whereI is the(L− 1)× (L− 1) identity matrix andλ is an arbitrary scalar function of̂p
such that
sign(λ(p̂)) = sign det
(
I





Although dp̂/dt is not directly defined at̂p = p̂0 or for a competitive equilibrium price
systemp̂, it can be appropriately defined by taking a limit. The process corresponds to Wal-
rasian tatonnement at̂p0, and it becomes Smale’s global Newton method as it approaches
an equilibrium.









∃θ ∈ [0,1], for l = 1, . . . , L− 1, θ ẑl(p̂)=(1−θ)(p̂l−p0l )
}
.
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It is easily verified thatθ = 0 yieldsp = p0 as the unique solution, sop0 ∈ P . By consider-
ingθ = 1 it follows that ifp∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with∑Ll=1(p∗l )2 = 1,
then(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
L−1) ∈ P . From the definition of the setP it follows that the differential
equation adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand at a price system is proportional
to the difference between this price system and the initial price system.
Kamiya (1990)shows that under suitable differentiability assumptions, for a generic
economy, the component ofP containingp0 is a path that connectsp0 to a Walrasian
equilibrium price system. Since we do not make any differentiability assumptions, nor do
we restrict ourselves to generic economies, we want to show that the component ofP
containingp0 connectsp0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Kamiya’s adjustment
process is said to be convergent if this latter property holds.
First, we give a different characterization of the setP . It follows from the boundary
behavior and the continuity ofz that there exists̄ε > 0, ε̄ ≤ p0L, such thatzL(p) > 0
wheneverpL ≤ ε̄ and
∑L








2 ≤ 1 − ε̄2
}
.
For any non-empty, closed, convex subsetX of Rm, the continuous functionπX : Rm → X
is the orthogonal projection onX, soπX(y) = x if x ∈ X and‖y − x‖2 ≤ ‖y − x̄‖2, for
all x̄ ∈ X, i.e.πX(y) is the closest point inX to y. We extend the excess demand function
ẑ to a functionz̃ defined onRL−1 by setting
z̃(p̂) = ẑ(π
BL−1+ (ε̄)
(p̂)), p̂ ∈ RL−1.
We define the set̃P by omitting the non-negativity constraints on prices inP and replacing
ẑ(p̂) by z̃(p̂), so
P̃ = {p̂ ∈ RL−1|∃θ ∈ [0,1], for l = 1, . . . , L− 1, θ z̃l(p̂) = (1 − θ)(p̂l − p0l )}.






2 = 1, it holds that P = P̃ .
Proof. Consider somêp ∈ P . First, it is shown thatp̂ ∈ BL−1+ (ε̄). Suppose not, then
0 <
√
1 −∑L−1l=1 (p̂l)2 < ε̄, so zL(p̂1, . . . , p̂L−1,
√
1 −∑L−1l=1 (p̂l)2) > 0. By Walras’s





Sincep̂ ∈ P there isθ ∈ [0,1] such thatθ ẑl(p̂) = (1 − θ)(p̂l − p0l ), l = 1, . . . , L − 1.
If θ = 0, thenp̂ = p̂0, which implies
√
1 −∑L−1l=1 (p̂l)2 = p0L ≥ ε̄, contradicting our
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supposition. Ifθ = 1, thenẑ(p̂) = 0, which contradicts 0>∑L−1l=1 p̂l ẑl(p̂). It follows that
θ ∈ (0,1). But then, using the definition of the setP ,
L−1∑
l=1




p̂l(p̂l − p0l ) > 0,
where the inequality comes from̂p0 = p̂, ∑L−1l=1 p0l ≤ ∑L−1l=1 p̂l, andθ < 1. This con-
tradicts 0>
∑L−1
l=1 p̂l ẑl(p̂). Consequently, p̂ ∈ BL−1+ (ε̄), from which it is obtained that
z̃(p̂) = ẑ(p̂) andp̂ ∈ P̃ .
Now consider somêp ∈ P̃ . Supposep̂ /∈ BL−1+ (ε̄). Denote the projectionπBL−1+ (ε̄)(p̂)
by π̂ . Then there isl′ such thatπ̂l′ = 0 or
∑L−1
l=1 π̂l = 1 − ε̄. In the former case, it holds
thatp̂l′ ≤ 0 andz̃l′(p̂) > 0, and for someθ ∈ (0,1),1
0< θz̃l′(p̂) = (1 − θ)(p̂l′ − p0l′) < 0,
a contradiction. In the latter case it holds that 0>
∑L−1
l=1 π̂l z̃l(p̂) and, for someθ ∈ (0,1),
θ z̃l(p̂) = (1 − θ)(p̂l − p0l ), l = 1, . . . , L − 1. Because of the contradiction obtained to
π̂l′ = 0 in the former case, we may assume without loss of generality thatπ̂  0, so





π̂l z̃l(p̂) = λ
L−1∑
l=1




p̂l(p̂l − p0l ) > 0,
a contradiction. Consequently, p̂ ∈ BL−1+ (ε̄), from which it is obtained that̃z(p̂) = ẑ(p̂)
andp̂ ∈ P . 
The lemma makes clear that we may either study the setP or the setP̃ in order to study
the adjustment process.
Forλ ≥ 0, we define the set
T L−1(λ) = {p̂ ∈ RL−1|‖p̂ − p̂0‖2 ≤ λ}.
In Fig. 1 the setT L−1(λ) is shown for various values ofλ for the caseL = 3. The set
T L−1(0) contains only the pointp0. The setT L−1(λ) expands whenλ increases, and
T L−1(1) contains the seṫBL−1+ . For p̂ ∈ RL−1, we defineλ(p̂) as the distance tôp0,
λ(p̂) = ‖p̂ − p̂0‖2. It is immediate that̂p ∈ T L−1(λ) for all λ ≥ λ(p̂).
We define the functionf : [0,1] × T L−1(1)→ T L−1(1) by
f (λ, p) = πT L−1(λ)(p + z̃(p)).
The fixed points of coincide with the prices in the setP .




2 = 1, it holds that p̂ ∈ P if and only if there is λ ∈ [0,1], such that f (λ, p̂) = p̂.
1 The argument thatθ ∈ (0,1) is similar to the one in the first part of this proof.
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Fig. 1. The setṡBL−1+ , T L−1(0), T L−1(1/3), T L−1(2/3) andT L−1(1), for p̂0 = (1/3,1/3).
Moreover, either ẑ(p̂) = 0 andλ = λ(p̂) or z(p̂) = 0 and f (λ, p̂) = p̂ for all
λ ≥ λ(p̂).
Proof. Consider a fixed point̂p of f (λ, ·), so p̂ = f (λ, p̂) = πT L−1(λ)(p̂ + z̃(p̂)). We
show thatp̂ ∈ P̃ , from which it follows thatp̂ ∈ P by Lemma 5.1.
Sincef (0, p̂) = p̂0, it is obvious thatf (0, p̂) = p̂ impliesp̂ = p̂0, sop̂ ∈ P̃ .
Consider the caseλ > 0. The projection of an arbitrary vectorx on the setT L−1(λ) is







(yl − xl)2 s.t. λ2 −
L−1∑
l=1
(yl − p0l )2 ≥ 0.
The necessary and sufficient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by












(yl − p0l )2 ≥ 0,
µ ≥ 0,
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wherey equals the projectionπT L−1(λ)(x) andµ denotes the shadow price of the constraint
λ2 −∑L−1l=1 (yl − p0l )2 ≥ 0.
It follows that there existsµ ≥ 0 such that
z̃l(p̂) = 2µ(p̂l − p0l ), l = 1, . . . , L− 1.
Sinceµ ≥ 0, it follows thatp̂ ∈ P̃ .
Consider somêp ∈ P̃ . If ẑ(p̂) = 0, then it is trivially the case thatf (λ, p̂) = p̂ for
all λ ≥ λ(p̂). Supposêz(p̂) = 0. If λ(p̂) = 0, thenp̂ = p̂0 and trivially f (0, p̂0) = p̂0.
Supposêz(p̂) = 0 andλ(p̂) > 0. We need to show thatf (λ(p̂), p̂) = p̂, which is equivalent
to the statement that the projection ofp̂ + z̃(p̂) onT L−1(λ(p̂)) equalsp̂.
Sinceλ(p̂) > 0 there existsθ ∈ (0,1) such thatθ z̃l(p) = (1 − θ)(pl − p0l ), l =
1, . . . , L − 1. Substitute in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions,yl = p̂l , xl = p̂l + z̃l(p̂), µ =
θ/(2(1− θ)) and observe that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
are satisfied. 
Whenp∗ is a competitive equilibrium, then(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
L−1) is a fixed point off for
any value ofλ exceedingλ(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
L−1). When p̂ is a price system generated by the
adjustment process, but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, thenp̂ is a fixed
point off (λ(p̂), ·).
At p̂0 the value ofλ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value ofλ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 5.3. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function






Proof. It is immediate thatf satisfies the conditions of Browder’s fixed point theorem
and so there is a componentF c of F = {(λ, p̂) ∈ [0,1] × T L−1(1)|p̂ = f (λ, p̂)}
such that({0} × T L−1(1)) ∩ F c = ∅ and ({1} × T L−1(1)) ∩ F c = ∅. Let the projec-
tion functiong : [0,1] × T L−1(1) → T L−1(1) be defined byg(λ, p̂) = p̂. By The-
orem5.2 it follows thatg(F ) = P . Sinceg is continuous, g(F c) is a connected subset
of P that connects the starting price system̂p0 to some competitive equilibrium price
systemp̂∗. 
Convergence of the price adjustment process is a corollary to Browder’s fixed point
theorem.
6. The price adjustment process of van der Laan and Talman
van der Laan and Talman (1987)introduce a price adjustment process for an exchange
economy. The prices of the commodities are normalized by
∑L
l=1pl = 1. Given a total
excess demand functionz : RL++ → RL and a starting price systemp0 ∈ RL++ with∑L
l=1p
0
l = 1, the adjustment process generates price systems in the set





















Two types of restrictions are made on prices in the setP . The first is an innocuous price
normalization,
∑L
l=1pl = 1. The second concerns the requirement that the relative price of
a commodity, i.e. the ratio of the price of a commodity and its initial price, be minimal when
the commodity is in positive excess supply, and maximal when the commodity is in positive
excess demand. This is closely related to the ideas behind Walrasian tatonnement, where
prices of commodities in positive excess supply are decreased and those of commodities in
positive excess demand are increased. It is obvious that the starting price systemp0 b longs
toP . It can also be verified that wheneverp∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with∑L
l=1p∗l = 1, thenp∗ ∈ P .
In Herings (1997), it is shown that under suitable differentiability assumptions, for a
generic economy, the component ofP containingp0 is a path that connectsp0 to a Wal-
rasian equilibrium price system. Since in this section we do not make any differentiability
assumptions, nor do we restrict ourselves to generic economies, we want to show that the
component ofP containingp0 connectsp0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. The
adjustment process is said to be convergent if this latter property holds.
To simplify the exposition, we renormalize the units of measurement of quantities of







pl = 1, for l′ = 1, . . . , L, zl′(p) < 0
⇒ pl′ = minl=1,... ,Lpl, for l′ = 1, . . . , L, zl′(p) > 0
⇒ pl′ = maxl=1,...,Lpl
}
.
We may also take the value of excess demandv(p), defined by a functionv : RL++ → RL,
where
vl(p) = plzl(p), l = 1, . . . , L,
instead of the excess demandz(p), to define the setP . Sincev(p) is positive (negative) if
and only ifz(p) is positive (negative), it follows that replacingz(p) by v(p) leaves the set
P unchanged.
We assume thatz : RL++ → RL is an excess demand function, so it satisfies
Assumption 2.
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Assumption 2. The functionz : RL++ → RL satisfies continuity, homogeneity, Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
If (pn)n∈N is a sequence converging tōp ∈ RL+ \ {0}, then limn→∞‖z(pn)‖∞ = +∞.
Contrary to the boundary behavior inAssumption 1, Assumption 2follows from standard
assumptions on primitives, that is from standard assumptions on consumption sets, utility
functions, and initial endowments.
The continuity and the boundary behavior ofz imply that we can choosēε > 0 such that
for anyp̄ /∈ SL(ε̄) = {p ∈ SL|pl ≥ ε̄, l = 1, . . . , L}, it holds thatzl(p̄) > 0 for somel
with 0< p̄l ≤ ε̄.
We modify the value functionv near the boundary of the unit simplexSL and extend it
to a functionṽ defined onT L = {p ∈ RL|∑Ll=1pl = 1} by setting
ṽ(p) = v(πSL(ε̄)(p)), p ∈ T L.
We define the set̃P by omitting non-negativity constraints and replacingz(p) by ṽ(p), so
P̃ = {p ∈ T L| for l′ = 1, . . . , L, ṽl′(p) < 0 ⇒ pl′ = minl=1,... ,Lpl,
for l′ = 1, . . . , L, ṽl′(p) > 0 ⇒ pl′ = maxl=1,..., Lpl}.
Lemma 6.1. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, it holds that
P = P̃ .
Proof. Consider somēp ∈ P . It is immediate that̄p ∈ SL(ε̄) andṽ(p̄) = v(p̄). Therefore,
ṽl(p) > 0 if and only if zl(p) > 0 andṽl(p) < 0 if and only if zl(p) < 0. So, p̄ ∈ P̃ .
Consider somēp ∈ P̃ . Supposep̄ /∈ SL(ε̄). There isl′ such thatπSL(ε̄)l′ (p̄) = ε̄ and
zl′(πSL(ε̄)(p̄)) > 0. But thenṽl′(p̄) > 0 andp̄l′ < maxl=1,...,Lp̄l , a contradiction tōp ∈ P̃ .
Consequently, p̄ ∈ SL(ε̄). Therefore, ṽl(p) > 0 if and only if zl(p) > 0 andṽl(p) < 0 if
and only ifzl(p) < 0. So, p̄ ∈ P . 
Forλ ≥ 0, we define the set
T L(λ) = {p ∈ T L|pk − pl ≤ λ, k, l = 1, . . . , L, k = l}.
In Fig. 2 the setT L(λ) is shown for various values ofλ. The setT L(0) contains only the
point (1/3,1/3,1/3). The setT L(λ) expands whenλ increases. The setT L(1) contains
the setSL.
Forp ∈ RL, we defineλ(p) = maxk =lpk − pl . It is immediate thatp ∈ T L(λ) for all
λ ≥ λ(p). We define the functionf : [0,1] × T L(1)→ T L(1) by
f (λ, p) = πT L(λ)(p + ṽ(p)).
The fixed points of coincide with the prices in the setP .
Theorem 6.2. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 2, it holds that
p ∈ P if and only if there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that f (λ, p) = p. Moreover, either z(p) = 0
and λ = λ(p), or z(p) = 0 and f (λ, p) = p for all λ ≥ λ(p).
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Fig. 2. The setsSL, T L(0), T L(1/3), T L(2/3) andT L(1).
Proof. Consider a fixed point̄p of f (λ̄, ·), sop̄ = f (λ̄, p̄) = πT L(λ̄)(p̄+ ṽ(p̄)). We show
thatp̄ ∈ P̃ , from which it follows thatp̄ ∈ P by Lemma 6.1.








(yl − xl)2 s.t.
L∑
l=1
yl − 1 = 0, yk − yl − λ ≥ 0, k = l.
The necessary and sufficient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by






µk,l, l = 1, . . . , L,
L∑
l=1
yl − 1 = 0,
µk,l(yk − yl − λ) = 0, k = l,
yk − yl − λ ≥ 0, k = l,
µk,l ≥ 0, k = l,
wherey equals the projectionπT L(λ)(x), µ denotes the shadow price of the constraint∑L
l=1 yl−1 = 0, andµk,l , k = l, denotes the shadow price of the constraintyk−yl−λ ≥ 0.








µk,l, l = 1, . . . , L.































 = 1 + Lµ,







µk,l, l = 1, . . . , L.
It also holds that
µk,l(p̄k − p̄l − λ̄) = 0, k = l.
Supposẽvl′(p̄) < 0 for somel′. Thenµk,l′ > 0 for somek, sop̄l′ = p̄k − λ̄. Since for all
l, p̄l ≥ p̄k − λ̄, it holds thatp̄l′ = minl=1,...,Lp̄l . Similarly it can be shown that̃vl′(p̄) > 0
impliesp̄l′ = maxl=1,...,Lp̄l . Consequently, it holds that̄p ∈ P̃ .
Consider somēp ∈ P̃ . If z(p̄) = 0, then it is trivially the case thatf (λ, p̄) = p̄ for allλ ≥
λ(p̄). Supposez(p̄) = 0. We need to show thatf (λ(p̄), p̄) = p̄,which implies that the pro-
jection ofp̄+ ṽ(p̄) onT L(λ̄) equalsp̄. This is achieved by substituting in the Kuhn–Tucker
conditionsyl = p̄l , xl = p̄l + ṽl(p̄), µ = 0, λ = λ(p̄), µk,l = ṽk(p̄)ṽl(p̄)/v if
ṽk(p̄) > 0 andṽl(p̄) < 0, andµk,l = 0, otherwise, wherev =
∑
{l|ṽl (p̄)<0} ṽl(p̄). Observe
that all equalities and inequalities in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions are satisfied. 
Whenp∗ is a competitive equilibrium, thenp∗ is a fixed point of for any value ofλ
exceedingλ(p∗). Whenp is a price system generated by the adjustment process, but not a
competitive equilibrium, thenp is a fixed point of (λ(p), ·).
At p0 the value ofλ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value ofλ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 6.3. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 2.
Proof. It is immediate thatf satisfies the conditions of Browder’s fixed point theorem
and so there is a componentF c of F = {(λ, p) ∈ [0,1] × T L(1)|p = f (λ, p)} such
that ({0} × T L(1)) ∩ F c = ∅ and({1} × T L(1)) ∩ F c = ∅. Let the projection function
g : [0,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) be defined byg(λ, p) = p. By Theorem 6.2it follows
thatg(F ) = P . Sinceg is continuous, g(F c) is a connected subset ofP that connects the
starting price systemp0 to some competitive equilibrium price systemp∗. 
Once again, the convergence of a price adjustment process is intimately connected to
Browder’s fixed point theorem.
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7. The global Newton method of Smale
The following assumption on the excess demand functionz is made throughout this
section.
Assumption 3. The functionz : RL+ \{0} → RL satisfies continuity, homogeneity, Walras’
law and the following boundary behavior:
For everyp ∈ RL+ \ (RL++ ∪{0}), z(p)− z̄(p) is not radially outward pointing, i.e. there
is noµ > 0 such thatz(p)− z̄(p) = µ(p− (1/L) ), wherez̄(p) = ∑Ll=1 zl(p)/L is the
mean excess demand atp, and is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
Assumption 3is a weak version of the assumption inSmale (1976), where twice continu-
ous differentiability ofz is assumed and a rather complicated and strong boundary condition
is stated. An illustration of a radially outward pointing vectorz(p)− z̄(p) for various val-
ues ofp can be found inFig. 3. It holds thatz(p)− z̄(p) is radially outward pointing if it
lies on the ray starting at 0 and passing throughp − (1/L) . We normalize prices, such as
to belong to the unit simplexSL.
The assumed boundary behavior is weaker than the requirement thatzl(p) > 0 for some
l ∈ L for whichpl = 0, a requirement that is natural for a function defined onRL+ \ {0}.
Indeed, if l is such thatpl = 0 andzl(p) > 0, then Walras’ law implies that there is
l′ such thatpl′ > 0 andzl(p) > zl′(p). So, zl(p) − z̄(p) > zl′(p) − z̄(p), whereas
−1/L = pl − 1/L < pl′ − 1/L, which implies thatz(p) − z̄(p) is not radially outward
pointing.
There are several versions of Smale’s global Newton method. Here we combine the
approaches suggested inSmale (1976)on page 117, andVarian (1977)2 to apply Smale’s
method to the functioñz : DL → RL defined by
z̃(p) = π̃(p)− p + (1 − ‖p − (1/L) ‖2) (z(π̃(p))− z̄(π̃(p)) ) , p ∈ DL,
whereDL = {p ∈ RL|∑Ll=1(pl − 1/L)2 ≤ 1 and∑Ll=1pl = 1}, a disk containingSL in
its interior, andπ̃ denotes the radial projection onSL. Forp with
∑L
l=1pl = 1 not inSL,
the radial projection ofp onSL is given by the price system where the line betweenp and
(1/L) hits the boundary ofSL. If p with
∑L
l=1pl = 1 does not belong toSL, then, for






If p ∈ SL, thenπ̃(p) = p.
The functionz̃ is simply an extension of the functionz(·)− z̄(·) multiplied by a positive
number to a disk containing the unit simplex in its interior. The vectorz̃(p) is the sum of
the termsπ̃(p) − p andz(π̃(p)) − z̄(π̃(p)) , where the latter term is multiplied by the
non-negative number(1−‖p− (1/L) ‖2). It is a positive multiple ofz(p)− z̄(p) onSL,
2 The construction ofVarian (1977)applies to a more abstract problem on the unit disk, but our variation of his
construction to the setSL is rather straightforward.
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Fig. 3. A vectorz(p)− z̄(p̄) that is radially outward pointing forp = p1, p2, . . . , p9.
sinceπ̃(p) = p for p ∈ SL. The contribution of the termz(π̃(p)) − z̄(π̃(p)) vanishes
on the relative boundary ofDL, where it holds that‖p − (1/L) ‖2 = 1. This makes the
function z̃ radially inward pointing on the relative boundary ofDL.
The zero points ofz and z̃ coincide. Indeed, there are no equilibria ofz̃ on the relative
boundary ofDL as the term 1− ‖p − (1/L) ‖2 vanishes there and the remaining term is
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π̃(p)− p. OnSL, the functionz̃ is a positive multiple ofz(·)− z̄(·) . Obviously the zero
points ofz(·)− z̄(·) andz coincide. Consider a pointp not on the relative boundary ofDL
and outsideSL. Thenz̃(p) = 0 if and only if
π̃(p)− p + (1 − ‖p − (1/L) ‖2)(z(π̃(p))− z̄(π̃(p)) ) = 0.
Then it holds that
z(π̃(p))− z̄(π̃(p)) = 1
1 − ‖p − (1/L) ‖2 (p − π̃(p))
= −Lpl′
1 − ‖p − (1/L) ‖2 (π̃(p)− (1/L) ),
wherel′ ∈ arg minl=1,...,Lpl . This implies thatz is radially outward pointing at̃π(p), a
contradiction to Assumption 3.4.
Let ẑ be the functioñz with the last component omitted. The differential equation of








whereλ is an arbitrary scalar function ofp such that





Since the sum of the components ofz̃(p) equals zero, it holds that∂z̃(p) = 0. Then
∂ẑ(p)(dp/dt) = −λ(p)ẑ(p) implies∂z̃L(p)(dp/dt) = −λ(p)z̃L(p), so the adjustment of
the price of commodityL is similar to the adjustment of the prices of the other commodities.
Since (dp/dt) = 0, the sum of the prices is kept equal to one.
The starting price systemp0 has to be chosen in the relative boundary ofDL to guarantee
convergence to a competitive equilibrium price system. InKeenan (1981)it has been shown
that Smale’s process may not converge for starting price systems in the relative interior
of DL.
As Smale (1976)shows, his process generates price systems in the set
P = {p ∈ DL|∃θ ≥ 0, z̃(p) = θ z̃(p0)}.
It is easily verified, by takingθ = 1, thatp0 ∈ P , and, by takingθ = 0, thatp∗ ∈ P if
p∗ ∈ SL is an equilibrium price system. By the arguments given before there are no solutions
for θ = 0 withp∗ ∈ DL \SL. From the definition of the setP it follows that the differential
equation adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand remains proportional to the
excess demand at the starting price system.
Under suitable differentiability assumptions, for a generic economy,S ale (1976)shows
that the component ofP containingp0 is a path that connectsp0 to a Walrasian equilibrium
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Fig. 4. The setsSL, T L(0), T L(1/3), T L(2/3) andT L(1), for p0 = (0.545,−0.455,0.91).
price system. We show that even without such differentiability assumptions, and without
restricting attention to generic economies, the component ofP containingp0 connects
p0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Smale’s global Newton method is said to be
convergent if this latter property holds.
Forλ ≥ 0, we define the set
T L(λ) = {p ∈ DL|p · z̃(p0) ≤ (1 − 2λ)p0 · z̃(p0)}.
In Fig. 4the setT L(λ) is shown for various values ofλ. The setT L(0) contains only the
pointp0. The setT L(λ) expands whenλ increases. The setT L(1) equalsDL. Forp ∈ DL,
we defineλ(p) = (p − p0) · z̃(p0)/− 2p0 · z̃(p0). It holds thatp ∈ T L(λ) if and only if
λ ≥ λ(p).
We define the functionf : [0,1] × T L(1)→ T L(1) by
f (λ, p) = πT L(λ)(p + z̃(p)).
Theorem 7.1. For any excess demand function z satisfying Assumption 3, for any p0 in
the relative boundary of DL, it holds that p ∈ P if and only if there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that
f (λ, p) = p. Moreover, either z̃(p) = 0 and λ = λ(p) or z̃(p) = 0 and f (λ, p) = p for
all λ ≥ λ(p).
Proof. Consider a fixed point̄p of f (λ̄, ·), sop̄ = f (λ̄, p̄) = πT L(λ̄)(p̄+ z̃(p̄)). We show
thatp̄ ∈ P .
Sincef (0, p̄) = p0, it is obvious thatf (0, p̄) = p̄ implies p̄ = p0, so p̄ ∈ P . Next
consider the casēλ > 0. For p̄ in the relative boundary ofDL, z̃(p̄) is radially inward
pointing, so obviouslyπT L(λ̄)(p̄ + z̃(p̄)) = p̄. Considerp̄ in the relative interior ofDL.
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Thenp̄ = πT L(λ̄)(p̄ + z̃(p̄)) if and only if the projection ofp̄ + z̃(p̄) on T̃ L(λ) = {p ∈
R
L|p · z̃(p0) ≤ (1 − 2λ̄)p0 · z̃(p0)} equalsp̄.








(yl − xl)2 s.t. (1 − 2λ)p0 · z̃(p0)− y · z̃(p0) ≥ 0.
The necessary and sufficient Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimum are given by
y − x + µz̃(p0) = 0,
µ((1 − 2λ)p0 · z̃(p0)− y · z̃(p0)) = 0,
(1 − 2λ)p0 · z̃(p0)− y · z̃(p0) ≥ 0,
µ ≥ 0,
wherey equals the projectionπ
T̃ L(λ)
(x) andµ denotes the shadow price of the constraint
(1 − 2λ)p0 · z̃(p0)− y · z̃(p0) ≥ 0.
Sincep̄ = πT L(λ̄)(p̄ + z̃(p̄)), it follows that there existsµ ≥ 0 such that
p̄ − p̄ − z̃(p̄)+ µz̃(p0) = 0,
so z̃(p̄) = µz̃(p0), andp̄ ∈ P . This completes the first part of the proof.
Consider somēp ∈ P . If z̃(p̄) = 0, then it is trivially the case thatf (λ, p̄) = p̄whenever
p̄ ∈ T L(λ), i.e. whenλ ≥ λ(p̄). Supposẽz(p̄) = 0. It is obvious thatf (λ, p̄) = p̄ when
λ = λ(p̄). It remains to be shown thatf (λ(p̄), p̄) = p̄. If λ(p̄) = 0, thenp̄ = p0 and
trivially f (0, p0) = p0. Supposẽz(p̄) = 0 andλ(p̄) > 0. There existsθ > 0 such
that z̃(p̄) = θ z̃(p0). From the necessary and sufficient Kuhn–Tucker conditions it follows
thatπ
T̃ L(λ(p̄))
(p̄ + z̃(p̄)) = p̄. Sincep̄ ∈ T L(λ(p̄)) ⊂ T̃ L(λ(p̄)), it holds as well that
πT L(λ(p̄))(p̄ + z̃(p̄)) = p̄. 
Theorem 7.1establishes that the fixed points off coincide with the prices in the setP .
Whenp∗ is a competitive equilibrium price system, thenp∗ is a fixed point of for any
value ofλ exceedingλ(p∗). Whenp is a price system generated by the adjustment process,
but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, thenp is a fixed point of (λ(p), ·),
whereλ(p) < 1.
At p0 the value ofλ(·) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value ofλ(·)
increases initially, but it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches
the value 1, and a competitive equilibrium has been found.
Theorem 7.2. The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function
satisfying Assumption 3, for any p0 in the relative boundary of DL.
Proof. It is immediate thatf satisfies the conditions of Browder’s fixed point theorem
and so there is a componentF c of F = {(λ, p) ∈ [0,1] × T L(1)|p = f (λ, p)} such
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that ({0} × T L(1)) ∩ F c = ∅ and({1} × T L(1)) ∩ F c = ∅. Let the projection function
g : [0,1] × T L(1) → T L(1) be defined byg(λ, p) = p. By Theorem 5.2 it follows
thatg(F ) = P . Sinceg is continuous, g(F c) is a connected subset ofP that connects the
starting price systemp0 to some competitive equilibrium price systemp∗. 
The proof ofTheorem 7.2show that convergence of the price adjustment process is a
corollary to Browder’s fixed point theorem.
8. From orbits to differential equations
In the previous five sections, the orbit of a number of adjustment processes is specified
as being the set of fixed points of a continuous functionf : [0,1] × S → S. In the
strategy adjustment processes ofSections 3 and 4, the specification of is straightforward.
In the price adjustment processes inSections 5–7, f (λ, p) = πT L(λ)(p + z̃(p)), with z̃
corresponding to some normalization of the excess demand function andT L(λ) a set that
expands inλ and being such thatT L(1) = S. By choosing different normalizations forz̃ and
different expanding setsT L(λ), it is possible to generate new price adjustment processes,
as is illustrated at the end of this section.
It has been argued inSection 2that, under suitable differentiability and transversality
conditions, the orbits generated by the adjustment processes are well-behaved sets. If so,
the reverse of the question treated so far in the exposition arises, i.e. whether it is possible
to find a system of differential equations that generates a given orbit.
Consider first the case where the differentiable orbit(λ( ), s(t)) corresponding to the
fixed points off can be parameterized by arc lengtht . Notice thatλ(0) = 0 and thats(0)
is the starting point of the adjustment process.
Let the functiong be defined byg(λ, s) = f (λ, s) − s. Suppose that zero is a regular
value of bothg and of the restriction ofg to {0,1} × S. Let J (λ, s) denote the Jacobian of
g evaluated at(λ, s). The matrixJ (λ, s) is L × (L + 1), with L the dimension ofS, and
has rankL because of the regularity assumptions made with respect tog.
These regularity assumptions also imply that there is a unique vectorT (J (0, s(0))) in
the kernel ofJ (0, s(0)) satisfying‖T (J (0, s(0)))‖2 = 1 and with the first component of
T (J (0, s(0))) positive. LetT (J (λ, s)) denote the unique vector in the kernel ofJ (λ, s)









T (J (0, s(0)))
)
.
It can be shown that the orbit of zero points induced byg is generated by the autonomous
system of differential equations
(λ̇, ṡ) = T (J (λ, s)),
where(λ̇, ṡ) denotes differentiation with respect to arc length, see for instanceAllgower
and Georg (1983). The system of autonomous differential equations was first proposed by
Davidenko (1953), and is also referred to as the Davidenko equations.
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Using the Davidenko equations immediately leads to Smale’s process. Indeed, the orbit
of Smale’s process is characterized by the system of equations











The Davidenko equations specify that
(λ̇, ṗ) = T (J (λ, p)),










Sincez̃(p) = (1 − λ)z̃(p0), the specification of Smale’s process as inSection 7follows.
By varying the setT L(λ) it is possible to obtain new adjustment processes. Consider for
instance the case where the endogenous variablep elongs to a cube [0,1]L and the excess
demand functioñz : [0,1]L → RL satisfies the boundary conditionz̃l(p) ≥ 0 if pl = 0
andz̃l(p) ≤ 0 if pl = 1.
The cube [0,1]L could represent prices belonging to the set of extended real vectors
of dimensionL, andz̃ the excess demands of the firstL commodities out ofL + 1. The
price of commodityL + 1 is normalized to be equal to some constant. By Walras’ law it
follows that the market for commodityL+ 1 clears when the excess demands for the first
L commodities are zero.
Consider the case whereT L(λ) is an expanding cube,
T L(λ) = {p ∈ CL|(1 − λ)p0l ≤ pl ≤ p0l + λ(1 − p0l ), l = 1, . . . , L}.











The functionf : [0,1] × T L(1)→ T L(1) is defined by
f (λ, p) = πT L(λ)(p + z̃(p)).
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To analyze the properties off , consider first the projection of a vectorx ∈ RL onT L(λ).







(yl − xl)2 s.t. p0l − λp0l ≤ yl ≤ p0l + λ(1 − p0l ), l = 1, . . . , L.
The necessary and sufficient Kuhn–Tucker conditions, withµ−l andµ
+
l the Lagrange mul-
tipliers corresponding to the two inequality constraints related to commodityl, lead to:
yl − xl − µ−l + µ+l = 0,
µ−l (yl − p0l + λp0l ) = 0,
µ+l (−yl + p0l + λ(1 − p0l )) = 0,
yl − p0l + λp0l ≥ 0,
−yl + p0l + λ(1 − p0l ) ≥ 0,
µ−l ≥ 0,
µ+l ≥ 0.
It is easily verified thatxl > p0l + λ(1 − p0l ) impliesµ+l > 0, soyl = p0l + λ(1 − p0l ).
Also, xl < p0l − λp0l impliesµ−l > 0, soyl = p0l − λp0l . Otherwise, yl = xl andp0l +
λ(1 − p0l ) ≥ xl ≥ p0l − λp0l .
Fixed points of have nice properties. Consider(λ̄, p̄) such thatp̄ = πT L(λ̄)(p̄+ z̃(p̄)).
If p̄l + z̃(p̄) > p0l + λ̄(1−p0l ), thenp̄l = p0l + λ̄(1−p0l ). If p̄l + z̃(p̄) < p0l − λ̄p0l , then
p̄l = p0l − λ̄p0l . Otherwise it holds that̄pl = p̄l + z̃l(p̄), soz̃l(p̄) = 0. It follows that the
adjustment process generates price systems in the set
P = {p ∈ [0,1]L|∃λ̄ ∈ [0,1], for l = 1, . . . , L,
z̃l(p) > 0 ⇒ p̄l = p0l + λ̄(1 − p0l ), for l = 1, . . . , L,
z̃l(p) < 0 ⇒ p̄l = p0l − λ̄p0l , for l = 1, . . . , L,
z̃l(p) = 0 ⇒ p0l − λ̄p0l ≤ p̄l ≤ p0l + λ̄(1 − p0l )}.
It can be shown as before that the price adjustment process is convergent. Notice that the
price adjustment process has a very nice intuitive interpretation. Prices of commoditiesl
in excess demand are increased at a rate(1 − p0l ) with respect to the initial pricep0l and
prices of commoditiesl in excess supply are decreased at a ratep0l with respect to the
initial price. Prices of commodities whose markets are in equilibrium are adjusted such that
markets remain in equilibrium, as long as it is possible to do so for pricespl satisfying
p0l − λ̄p0l ≤ p̄l ≤ p0l + λ̄(1 − p0l ).
Is it possible to formulate a system of differential equations that generates the orbit of
the adjustment process above. Compared to the situation in the beginning of the section,
an additional difficulty is that orbits can only be expected to be piecewise differentiable.
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This problem can be solved by applying a so-calledα-transformation as proposed inGarcia
and Zangwill (1981). If we make the following substitutions into the system of first-order
conditions that characterizes the fixed points off ,
µ−l = [max{0, αl}]2,
pl − p0l + λp0l = [min{0, αl}]2,
µ+l = [max{0, βl}]2,
−pl + p0l + λ(1 − p0l ) = [min{0, βl}]2,
and rearrange terms, we find that the fixed points off are characterized by the solutions to
z̃l([min{0, α}]2 + p0 − λp0)+ [max{0, αl}]2 − [max{0, βl}]2 = 0,
[min{0, αl}]2 + [min{0, βl}]2 = λ.
Since the system above is differentiable inα, β andλ, it is possible to apply Davidenko’s
equations, and get a system of differential equations that generates the orbit of the adjustment
process.
9. Conclusion
We have studied the convergence of a number of distinct adjustment processes in game
theory and in general equilibrium theory. Convergence of the processes has been shown
before in the literature by rather ad hoc arguments, and only for generic games and generic
economies, under suitable differentiability assumptions. We have argued that the driving
force behind convergence is to be found in Browder’s fixed point theorem, which applies
under very general conditions and does not involve any assumptions on differentiability. It is
remarkable that not only existence of equilibrium, but also universal stability, is fundamen-
tally based on fixed point theory. The use of Browder’s result provides a uniform and simple
way to show convergence of all the adjustment processes considered. It also enables us to de-
sign a sheer unlimited number of new adjustment processes, that are universally convergent.
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